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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
JESSEE MAHONE, LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
~ ) 
PAUL V. VIERA, JR., individually and as ~) 
Managing Member of Earnest Holdings, 
LLC, and EARNEST HOLDINGS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Civil Action File No. 2007CV138625 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Counsel appeared before the Court on August 21, 2008, to present oral arguments on 
the following cross motions for partial summary judgment: (1) Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment as to Count I (Declaratory Judgment), filed April 23, 2008; and (2) 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed June 30, 2008. After reviewing the 
record of the case, the briefs submitted on the motions, and the arguments presented by 
counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
FACTS 
Plaintiff Jessee Mahone, LLC ("Mahone") brought this suit against Earnest Holdings, 
LLC ("Earnest Holdings"), and its Managing and majority Member, Paul V. Viera ("Mr. 
Viera"). Mahone, a/so a Member of Earnest Holdings, alleges that Mr. Viera and Earnest 
Holdings breached certain contractual obligations and engaged in tortuous conduct toward 
him. Additionally, Mahone seeks a declaratory judgment1 that ~ertain amendments2 to the 
1. Count I in the Complaint and Count V in the Amended Complaint seek declaratory 
judgment on several issues, including a determination that the amendments are null and void. 
2. At issue are eight (8) separate actions purpotedly taken by written consent of a Super 
Majority-in-Interest of Earnest Holdings, which are attached as Exhibits 81-8 to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Defendants argue that not all of the actions are 
1 
Earnest Holdings Operating Agreement are invalid because they were not adopted pursuant 
to the terms of the Operating Agreement. The parties filed their cross motions on this issue. 
In addition, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty 
claim against Mr. Viera. 
STANDARD 
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 
when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and 
that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant 
summary judgment as a matter of law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 
(1991). 
The internal affairs of a corporation, such as actions involving officers and directors, 
shall be regulated by the law of the state of incorporation. Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & 
Assoc., Architects & Planners, Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735 (1985). 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff's Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2(a). 
Defendants challenge Plaintiffs standing to seek a declaratory judgment arguing that there is 
no "actual controversy" in this case and that a declaratory judgment would be "fruitless." 
First, Defendants argue that the amendments, entered into over a series of years from 2001-
2007, have been fully authorized, executed, filed, and acted upon; therefore, Mahone's rights 
have already been fixed on the issue of amendments. Second, Defendants argue that 
"amendments" and that some are written consents pursuant to a specific provision of the 
Operating Agreement such as with Exhibit 83, which increases the amount of compensation 
paid to the Managing Member under Section 6.9. The Court, like Plaintiff, shall refer to each 
such action as an amendment, adopting the number of the corresponding exhibit, for 
purposes of ease and clarity for this Order. Such terminology, however, is not a legal 
conclusion about the effect or intent of the action. 
2 
Mahone, with a 10% interest in Earnest Holdings, does not hold an ownership interest great 
enough to prevent a super-majority approval even if the Court determined that additional 
notice procedures were required under the Operating Agreement. Virginian Ry. Co. v. 
System Fed'n. No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
The questions posed to the Court about amendments ultimately seek clarification 
about the approval procedures required under certain provisions of the Operating Agreement 
which would govern both past and future actions. The rights of the parties in their legal 
relationship are uncertain due to the parties' differing interpretation of key provisions in the 
Operating Agreement. Therefore, the Court concludes that issues raised with respect to the 
amendments present an actual controversy regarding the parties' rights and obligations that 
is the appropriate subject of a declaratory judgment. 
OPERATING AGREEMENT 
In determining the parties' rights under the Operating Agreement, the Court must first 
identify the relevant rules of contract construction. "The construction which will uphold a 
contract in whole and in every part is to be preferred, and the whole contract should be 
looked to in arriving at the construction of any part." O.C.G.A. §13-2-2 (4). In addition, 
extrinsic evidence is inadmissible and the meaning of the provisions shall be determined by 
the Court on the face of the Operating Agreement. O.C.G.A. §§ 13-2-1,2(1); Eagle 
Industries, Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 1228 (Del. Supr. 1997). 
A. Notice Requirement 
Plaintiff's interpretation of the Operating Agreement is that Section 7.2 modifies any 
section that requires Member consent, approval, or a vote.3 Section 7.2 titled "Meetings" 
3. The Operating Agreement alternately refers to Member action as "approve," "consent," or 
"vote." 
3 
outlines the procedures for calling, noticing, hosting, participating in, and voting at a meeting 
of the Members. Under Section 7, Earnest Holdings is not required to hold meetings and 
Section 7.2(i) titled "Action by Members Without a Meeting" establishes the procedures for 
voting via written consents. 
Any action required or permitted to be taken at a meeting of the Members may be 
taken without a meeting if one or more written consents, setting forth the action so 
taken or to be taken, is signed by a Majority-in-Interest of the Members, and written 
notice of any such action is given by the Managing member to the Members no less 
than two (2) business days prior to the effective date of the action. The Managing 
Member shall include such consent in the Company's records. The written consent of 
such Members has the same force and effect as a meeting vote of the Members and 
may be described as such in any document or instrument. 
Plaintiff's position is that every action requiring Member approval must be done in 
accordance with Section 7 either through a meeting or with written consent pursuant to 
Section 7.2(i). Because the amendments at issue in this motion were approved via written 
consents, Plaintiff argues that Earnest Holdings was required to provide every Member, 
including Jessee Mahone, notice of the amendment two (2) business days before its effective 
date. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not receive4 and did not waive its rights to receive such 
notice, and so Plaintiff urges the Court to declare that the amendments are null and void. 
Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Section 7.2 is a stand alone provision that 
governs meetings and actions to be taken at a meeting and only implicates those actions 
4. Notice of the amendments was not provided to Jessee Mahone two (2) business days in 
advance of the effective date of action in accordance with Section 7.2 (i). In March, 2004, 
Earnest Holdings provided Members with notice of amendments numbered 5, 6, and 7 after 
the effective date of each such amendment. In addition, Earnest Holding sent notice to 
Members in July, 2007 of amendment 8, after it was executed. Similarly, on April 2, 2008, 
Earnest Holdings provided notice to Members of amendment 9, which was executed on April 
4, 2008, but made effective on January 1, 2008. Amendment 9, is not specifically discussed 
in these motions, but would be required to follow the same procedures determined necessary 
by this Court to amend under the terms of the Operating Agreement. 
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requiring approval by a Majority-in-Interest of the Members.5 Defendants argue that 
provisions in the Operating Agreement requiring approval of a Super-Majority-in-lnterest6 of 
the Members are not bound by the procedural requirements in Section 7.2(i). Section 13.2, 
titled "Amendments" states that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided herein, this 
Agreement may be amended or modified from time to time only by a written instrument 
approved by a Super Majority-in-Interest of the Members." In addition, other provisions in the 
Operating Agreement, such as Section 6.9 and 6.1 allow the terms to be modified upon the 
approval or consent of a Super Majority-in-lnterest.7 The amendments at issue all involve 
provisions requiring approval by a Super Majority-in-Interest and therefore, Defendants 
argue, are not modified by the notice requirements required in Section 7.2(i). 
Pursuant to its Operating Agreement Earnest Holdings is not required to hold 
meetings, thus the Agreement contemplated actions to be taken by alternative means. 
Section 7.2(i), one of the alternative mechanisms, authorizes actions taken by written 
consents signed by a Majority-in-Interest with advance notice to Members, but does not 
govern all alternative actions by Members. The language of Section 7.2 "signed by a 
Majority-in-Interest" is not reconcilable with the language in other provisions requiring a Super 
5. "'Majority-in-Interest' of the Members at any particular time means the Member or 
Members owning at such time more than fifty percent (50%) of the Units owned by the 
Members entitled to vote with respect to the particular matter involved." 
6. '''Super Majority-in-Interest' of the Members at any particular time means the Member or 
Members owning at such time more than eighty percent (80%) of the Units owned by the 
Members entitled to vote with respect to the particular matter involved." 
7. Section 6.9 "Compensation" states that "compensation shall not exceed in the aggregate 
$100,000 per annum without the consent of a Super Majority-in-Interest of the Members." 
Section 6.1 "Management and Control" states that "the Managing Member shall not have the 
power or authority to do any of the following, without the prior approval a Super Majority-in-
Interest of the Members." 
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Majority-in-Interest. If Section 7.2(i) was intended to establish the procedures for Super 
Majority-in-Interest approvals in addition to Majority-in-Interest approvals, then the Operating 
Agreement could have stated so. To hold otherwise reads language and terms into the 
Operating Agreement that are not apparent from the face of the document. For example, 
compare Section 13.2, which specifically states that the Operating Agreement "may be 
amended or modified ... only by a written instrument approved by a Super Majority-in-
Interest. .. " with Section 7.2(i) which provided that actions "required or permitted to be taken 
at a meeting" may be taken with written consents signed by a Majority-in-Interest. (emphasis 
added) These sections state different standards for approval (Super Majority-in-Interest v. 
Majority-in-Interest) and different mechanisms (written instruments v. signed written 
consents). Therfore, the Court concludes that Section 7.2(i) does not modify provisions 
requiring approval by a Super Majority-in-Interest. 
Holding that Section 7.2(i) does not modify all actions to be taken by Members does 
not render the section meaningless. For example, Section 6.2 states that a Managing 
Member vacancy "shall be filled by appointment by a Majority-in-Interest of the Members." 
which would require that either (i) a meeting be held, or (ii) written consents be obtained 
pursuant to Section 7.2(i). 
The requirement for additional approval and notice procedures for Member actions 
requiring a Majority-in-Interest is a standard risk mitigation mechanism. The additional 
procedures including notice to all Members for votes that require a simple Majority-in-Interest 
decrease the risks to minority Members of losing control over the company (and their 
investments). With actions requiring a Super-Majority, the additional procedures required 
with Majority-in-Interest votes are not as necessary because obtaining an additional 30% 
voting interest in the company is itself the procedural barrier to the action, not notice to 
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Members. This is not to say that even with these procedural safeguard against loss of control, 
that a minority Member will not actually lose control (Le., the ability to influence management) 
over the company. Member action approval and procedural provisions are intended to 
mitigate these risks, but clearly as demonstrated with the facts presented in this case, cannot 
completely remove the control risk associated with minority member status. The only 
complete safeguard against loss of control is sufficient ownership interest percentages. 
B. Amendments 1, 2, & 3 
Amendments 1, 2, and 3 increase the amount of compensation paid to the Managing 
Member. Amendments 1 and 2, state "I consent to amend," but otherwise appear to be mere 
consents executed under Section 6.9, which allows for compensation to be increased with 
the "consent of a Super Majority-in-Interest". Amendment 3 uses the word "approve" and is 
on a document titled "Approval of Super Majority-in-Interest of the Members." Whether 
Amendments 1, 2 and 3 were executed pursuant to Section 13.2 as an "amendment" or 
pursuant to Section 6.9 is not determinative because both provisions require approval by a 
Super Majority-in-Interest. Therefore, Earnest Holdings was not required to follow the notice 
procedures in Section 7.2(i) for amendments 1,2, and 3. 
C. Amendments 4 & 5 
Amendments 4 and 5 modified Section 7.6 "Additional Members". Plaintiff highlights 
language in Section 7.68 which states that "Jessee Mahone, LLC (only so long as Wendell 
8. Section 7.6 Additional Members. 
Upon the consent of a Super Majority-in-Interest of the Members, the Managing 
member shall have authority and shall be permitted to admit additional 
Members, and issue to such Members Units, on such terms and conditions as 
the Managing Member shall deem appropriate .... Upon the admittance of 
additional Members, all Ownership Percentages of the Members and Assignees 
shall be diluted proportionately. Notwithstanding the foregoing, ... Jessee 
Mahone, LLC (only so long as Wendell M. Starke is living) shall be entitled to 
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M. Starke is living) shall be entitled to vote their respective Units and shall be taken into 
account for purposes of determining Super Majority-in-Interest consent. ... " (emphasis 
added). Plaintiff argues that the phrase "shall be entitled to vote" gives Jessee Mahone the 
limited right to cast a vote on the issue of admitting new members for so long as Wendell 
Starke is living. Plaintiff claims that the amendments are void because Jessee Mahone was 
denied the opportunity to vote on the amendments to a section in which it was guaranted 
voting rights. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the phrase is a recognition of voting 
power and a limitation on that right, not an absolute right or requirement to cast a vote. 
This issue would be determinative of the Court's decision only if Plaintiff were 
challenging action taken under the original Section 7.6 of the Operating Agreement. Instead, 
Plaintiff challenges the amendment to Section 7.6 and Earnest Holdings' subsequent actions 
taken pursuant to the revised section. The question before the Court on the cross motions 
for declaratory judgment asks whether the amendments to Section 7.6 are valid or invalid. 
The amendments state that they are approvals pursuant to Section 6.1, which allows the 
Managing Member to take actions contrary to the Operating Agreement with approval of a 
Super Majority-in-Interest. Whether the amendments are approvals pursuant to Section 6.1 
or "amendments" pursuant to Section 13.2 is not determinative for purposes of the motion 
before the Court because both provisions require approval by a Super Majority-in-Interest. 
Therefore, Earnest Holdings was not required to follow the notice procedures in Section 
7.2(i) for amendments 4 and 5. 
vote their respective Units and shall be taken into account for purposes of 
determining Super Majority-in-Interest consent under this Section 7.6. 
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D. Amendments 6, 7, 8, & 9 
The Court, having found above that Section 13.2 requires approval by a Super 
Majority-in-Interest and therefore is not subject to the notice requirements established in 
Section 7.2(i), finds that Earnest Holdings was not required to follow the notice procedures in 
Section 7.2(i) for amendments 6, 7, 8, and 9. 
E. Conclusion 
The procedures in Section 7.2 do not modify the specific provisions in Sections 13.2, 
6.1,6.9, and 7.6, or any other proVision requiring approval by a Super Majority-in-Interest. 
This interpretation respects the plain language of the contract, gives meaning and importance 
to all sections of the Operating Agreement, and reflects the parties' freedom of contract to 
structure the terms of this legal relationship as negotiated. Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory 
Judgment that the Amendments are null and void is hereby DENIED. 
Defendants sought a partial summary judgment declaring that the amendments are 
valid and enforceable. Plaintiff raised a limited objection to this motion on the grounds that 
discovery is not complete and there are outstanding issues with regard to the validity and 
enforceability of the amendments as executed, which Plaintiff argues, require additional 
analysis beyond the question of whether or not Mahone was entitled to notice. Additionally, 
new defendants9 challenged the propriety of Plaintiff's petition for declaratory judgment, but 
did not object to Defendants' motion, on the same grounds that discovery has not yet been 
completed and questions of fact remain. Therefore, the Court shall refrain from ruling on 
Defendants' motion for declaratory judgment and shall hold Defendants' motion open for 
9. Matthew Bronfman, EP Management Pool, LLC, and Bronfman Associates Ill's were 
added to this case as new defendants pursuant to an Order of this Court dated June 18, 2008 
granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint naming the aforementioned 
parties. 
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supplemental briefing until ten (10) days after the close of discovery. The Court considers 
Defendants' motion fully briefed and argued; however, counsel may submit supplemental 
briefs containing new evidence and arguments on the issues discussed herein. 
FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS 
Defendants' motion also sought summary judgment on Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary 
duty claims. Under Section 6.4 of the Operating Agreement, the Managing Member shall 
"exercise his duties with the same care and attention as a reasonable person would use in 
the prudent conduct of business," but owes no other fiduciary duties to the Members. 
Defendants argue that the same allegations form the basis of both Plaintiff's breach of 
fiduciary duty claims and breach of contract claims in violation of Delaware law. See, Blue 
Chip Capital Fund II LP v. Tubergen, 906 A.2d 827, 834 (Del. Ch. 2006); BAE Sys. North 
Am., Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 119, *28 (Del. Ch. Aug. 3, 2004). 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that a second line of cases controls and that the breach of 
contract and fiduciary duties claims should proceed simultaneously. See, RJ Assocs. v. 
Health payors' Org. Ltd. Pshp., 1999 WL 550350 (1999 Del. Ch. July 16,1999) (allowing 
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims to proceed simultaneously); see also, 
In Re Fruehauf Trailer Corp., v. Shriss W. Street, 369 B.R. 817, 830-831 (2007); Cantor 
Fitzgerald, L.P. v Cantor, 724 A.2d 571 (1998). 
Plaintiff also argues that their breach of fiduciary duty claims are based upon self-
dealing transactions such as loans, which are in addition to claims arising from the alleged 
breach of the Operating Agreement. Plaintiff petitions this Court for additional time to 
conduct discovery on these issues and requests that the Court refrain from ruling on the 
claim until after discovery is concluded. Therefore, the Court shall not rule on Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claims and shall hold that 
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motion open for supplemental briefing until ten (10) days after the close of discovery. The 
Court considers Defendants' motion fully briefed and argued; however, counsel may submit 
supplemental briefs containing new evidence and arguments on the issues presented in 
Defendants' motion. 
SO ORDERED this _~-=----_ day of ~~ 
Copies to: 
Erika C. Birg, Esq. 
Shuman Sohrn, Esq. 
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 
1545 Peachtree Street., NE, Suite 700 
Atlanta, GA 30309 
( 404) 885-1500 
(404) 892-7056 
John J. Dalton, Esq. 
Kaye Woodard Burwell, Esq. 
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 
5200 Bank of America Plaza 
600 Peachtree Street, N.E. 
Atlanta, GA 30308-2216 
( 404) 885-3442 
(Attorney for.:1 Paul E. Viera, Jr.) 
Thomas G. Sampson, Esq. 
Jeffrey E. Tompkins, Esq. 
Shukura L. Ingram, Esq. 
THOMAS KENNEDY SAMPSON & PATTERSON LLP 
3533 Main Street 
Atlanta, GA 30337 
( 404) 688-4503 
(404) 761-3224 fax 
(Attorneys for.:1 Earnest Holdings, LLC) 
,2008. 
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